An investigation shows that Israeli intelligence dropped the ball before Hamas’s attack on October 7

A report from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has shown some major errors that made the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, possible. This 19-page report points out issues in collecting information, a wrong idea of Hamas' plans, and how unready the IDF was to respond. It turned out that the intelligence groups didn't notice Hamas shifting from being quite practical to preparing a big attack. Some clues, such as Hamas stepping up their military actions, were missed or not understood right.

Hamas had been preparing for this attack for years, with signs going back to 2016. They pretended to want peace while secretly building up their military power. By May 2023, they decided to strike on a Jewish holiday to catch Israel off guard and possibly start a larger conflict.

When the attack happened, the IDF was not ready for how big and intense it was. Their Gaza Division was overwhelmed. The military's response was slow and complicated by confusion on the ground, bad troop placement, and not enough firepower. This led to a breakdown in how things were managed.

Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, the military chief, has stepped down due to these failures, taking responsibility for what happened. He admitted to the mistakes and said he would own up to them. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s chief of staff said Netanyahu hasn’t seen the full report yet.